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Abstract
We develop and compare two theories of professional forecasters’ strategic behav-
ior. The first theory, reputational cheap talk, posits that forecasters aim at convincing
the market that they are well informed. The market evaluates their forecasting tal-
ent on the basis of the forecasts and the realized state. If the market expects the
forecasters to report their posterior expectations honestly, then forecasts are shaded
toward the prior mean. With correct market expectations, equilibrium forecasts are
imprecise but not shaded. In the second theory, forecasters compete in a forecasting
contest with prespecified rules. In a winner-take-all contest, equilibrium forecasts
are excessively differentiated.
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1 Introduction
Professional forecasts guide market participants and inform their expectations about future
economic conditions. Given the importance of this role and the potential rewards of
accurate forecasting, we might expect that professional forecasters maximize their accuracy
by truthfully releasing all their information. As reported by Keane and Runkle (1998),
“since financial analysts’ livelihoods depend on the accuracy of their forecasts . . . , we can
safely argue that these numbers accurately measure the analysts’ expectations.”
However, many commentators argue that forecasters might strategically misreport their
information, even when they are not interested in manipulating the investment decisions
of their target audience. As suggested for example by Croushore (1997), “some [survey]
participants might shade their forecasts more toward the consensus (to avoid unfavorable
publicity when wrong), while others might make unusually bold forecasts, hoping to stand
out from the crowd.” The importance of microeconomic incentives of forecasters and ana-
lysts is stressed by a number of recent empirical studies, such as Ehrbeck and Waldmann
(1996), Graham (1999), Hong et al. (2000), Lamont (2002), Welch (2000), and Zitzewitz
(2001a).
In this paper we develop a theoretical framework for analyzing the strategic behavior of
professional forecasters. In the context of a simple model, we address how reputation and
competition affect the reporting incentives of forecasters. Because professional forecasts
are often used to proxy the unobservable expectations of market participants, our results
have implications for empirical tests of theories of investment behavior. In particular, we
study the reaction of market prices to the release of forecasts.
The basic ingredients of our model are best introduced by Figure 1, which depicts yearly
GNP growth forecasts and realizations for the period 1972—2004 from the Business Week
Investment Outlook. The forecasts data is taken from a survey of professional forecasters
run at the end of each year by the magazine Business Week. Because there is substantial
dispersion in the individual forecasts, our model assumes that forecasters are privately
informed. In addition, there is substantial variation in the forecast dispersion across years.
Hence, as parameters in our model we use the quality of private information and the
precision of the prior belief. The figure also shows the realized GNP growth rates released
by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The market uses these realizations to evaluate the
quality of information of the individual forecasters.1
1A perennial problem in evaluating forecasts is that data on the realized values are revised over time.
Figure 1 uses the latest revisions available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. See Section 7.1 for
more on this.
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Figure 1. The triangles represent individual forecasts of annual real GNP
growth rate from the Business Week Investment Outlook survey for the period
1972—2004. The connected circles represent the realized values obtained from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
We formulate two theories of strategic forecasting and contrast them with the bench-
mark case of nonstrategic forecasting. To facilitate the comparison, we adopt a unified,
tractable statistical model. The state has a normal prior distribution and the signals of
the forecasters are normally distributed around the state. After the forecasters simul-
taneously release their forecasts, the state is publicly observed. To isolate the effect of
the professional objectives of forecasters who predict the future evolution of economic or
financial variables, we assume that these forecasters cannot affect the distribution of the
state variable and do not care about the investment decisions taken on the basis of their
forecasts.
We consider the benchmark case of a forecaster rewarded according to the absolute
accuracy of her prediction. A nonstrategic forecaster reports honestly the posterior expec-
tation of the state, which is a weighted average of the signal and the mean of the prior
distribution. When the state turns out to be above the prior mean, the honest forecast
tends to be lower than the realized state.2 The correlation between forecasts and their
errors is zero for “rational” forecasts in Muth’s (1961) sense, because they are equal to
2The popular press often takes this empirically documented negative correlation of the forecast er-
rors with the realized state as evidence of herd behavior. The academic empirical literature avoids this
misconception and focuses instead on the correlation between forecasts and their errors.
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conditional expectations. The two theories of strategic forecasting that we develop here
have different implications for this correlation.
First, according to our theory of reputational cheap talk, forecasters wish to foster their
reputation for being well informed. In this first theory, the market uses forecasts and the
realized state to evaluate forecasting talent. In the baseline model, we further assume
that forecasters do not have private information about their own talent prior to receiving
their private signals.3 Contrary to naive intuition, we show that honest forecasting cannot
occur in equilibrium. If the market naively expects honest forecasting, the forecaster has
an incentive to bias the forecast toward the prior mean in order to be perceived to be
better informed. This finding accords with the intuitive implication of career concerns
suggested by recent empirical work. More generally, we show that if the market can invert
from forecasts to signals, the best reputational deviation for the forecaster is to pretend to
have received a signal equal to the posterior expectation of the state.
Concern for reputation drives forecasters to herd on the prior belief, but this incentive
is self defeating. In equilibrium, the market must have rational expectations about the
forecasters’ behavior. Then, equilibrium forecasts cannot be perfectly inverted, i.e., there
is no fully revealing equilibrium. We conclude that reputational equilibrium forecasts
are not shaded, but are systematically less precise than if forecasters were not strategic.
Paradoxically, the analysts’ desire to be perceived as good forecasters turns them into poor
forecasters.4
Our second theory of strategic behavior posits that forecasters compete in a forecasting
contest with pre-specified rules. Forecasters are often ranked by their relative accuracy, in
competitions such as the semi-annual Wall Street Journal Forecasting Survey (macroeco-
nomic variables), WSJ All Star Analysts (earnings), and WSJ Best on the Street (stock
picking). We find that reporting the best predictor of the state (the posterior expectation
conditional on the signal observed) is not an equilibrium in the tournament. With an
infinite number of forecasters, the equilibrium strikes a balance between two contrasting
forces. First, an individual forecaster has an incentive to report the honest forecast, which
is most likely to be on the mark. Second, a forecaster gains from moving away from the
prior mean, because the farther the state is from the prior mean, the lower the number
of forecasters correctly guessing the state. In equilibrium, forecasters differentiate their
predictions from those of competitors by putting greater weight on their private signals
than they would in an honest report of the posterior expectations. Yet, in principle ra-
3The importance of this assumption is discussed in Section 4.4.
4Ironically, The Economist (“Dustmen as Economic Gurus,” 3 June 1995) reports the surprisingly good
performance of a sample of London garbagemen in forecasting key economic variables.
3
tional market participants can invert the equilibrium strategy to recover the forecasters’
information and so construct accurate expectations about the state.
The presence of strategic behavior raises questions about the interpretation and use of
professional forecasts to test the predictions of theories on how agents’ decisions depend
on expectations. In empirical studies, professional forecasts are often used as proxies for
unobservable market expectations. Strategic forecasts do not reflect these expectations, if
they are taken at face value.
The two theories have implications for the dispersion of the forecasts and for the correla-
tion between forecasts and forecast errors. In the symmetric equilibrium of our forecasting
contest, the forecast error is positively correlated with the forecast, but the correlation is
negative in the reputational deviation. The reputational equilibrium forecast is uncorre-
lated with its error, but is not efficient. According to recent empirical work (Zitzewitz,
2001a, and Bernhardt et al., 2004), forecast errors exhibit a strong positive correlation
with forecasts, consistent with our contest theory.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the baseline model. Section 3
discusses the benchmark case of honest forecasting. Section 4 introduces the reputational
cheap talk theory. Section 5 develops the forecasting contest theory. Section 6 compares
the empirical implications of the different theories. Section 7 extends the baseline model in
two directions relevant for empirical work. Section 8 derives implications about the stock
price reaction to the arrival of a forecast. Section 9 concludes.
2 Model
Our baseline model considers n forecasters who simultaneously issue forecasts on an un-
certain state of the world. We assume that it is common prior belief that the state x is
normally distributed with mean µ and precision ν, i.e., x ∼ N (µ, 1/ν). Each forecaster
i observes the private signal si = x + εi. Conditional on state x, signals si are inde-
pendently normally distributed with mean x and precisions τ i, i.e., si|x ∼ N (x, 1/τ i).
Forecaster i’s observation of signal si leads to a normal posterior belief on the state with
mean E (x|si) = (τ isi + νµ) / (τ i + ν) and precision τ i+ν (cf. DeGroot, 1970). We denote
the density of this posterior distribution by qi(x|si).
We allow forecasters to have private information about the state, because their actual
forecasts are typically dispersed. If they honestly report their expectations, forecasters
who share a common prior belief and are given the same (public) information without
private information should make identical forecasts.5 To avoid introducing a bias against
5Forecast dispersion could also be due to heterogenous prior beliefs or different models. According
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honest forecasting, we posit that forecasters are endowed with some private information
about the state.6 Indeed, the presence of heterogeneous private information provides a
rationale to the market for rewarding the forecasters’ accuracy.
This model abstracts from the strategic incentives relevant to partisan forecasters,
whose payoff instead depends on the investment decisions made on the basis of their
forecasts.7 Our baseline model can be applied to situations in which the state cannot be
affected by the forecasts and yet can be meaningfully forecasted and later observed. In
Section 8.2, we extend the model to consider the additional strategic incentives that are
present when forecasters are concerned with the effect of their forecasts on the state.
3 Honest forecasting
Forecasters are presumed honest, unless proven strategic. As argued by Keane and Runkle
(1990), “professional forecasters . . . have an economic incentive to be accurate. Because
these professionals report to the survey the same forecasts that they sell on the market,
their survey responses provide a reasonably accurate measure of their expectations.”
Our benchmark forecast is the honest report of the Bayesian posterior expectation,
hi(si) = E (x|si) =
µ
τ i
τ i + ν
¶
si +
µ
ν
τ i + ν
¶
µ, (1)
as assumed by most empirical investigations. In the normal model, this posterior expecta-
tion minimizes the mean of any symmetric function of the forecast error, such as the mean
squared error (cf. Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer, 1985).
The honest forecast can offer some explanations for the data. First, forecast dispersion
is a consequence of private information.
Second, as also illustrated by Figure 1, forecasts tend to be less volatile than re-
alizations. This fact does not indicate the presence of herd behavior. The realization
to industry participants, forecasters seem to have access to the same pool of public data, but interpret
it differently depending on their model. Indeed, Kandel and Pearson (1995) and Kandel and Zilberfarb
(1999) have found empirical support for heterogeneous processing of public information. Note that the
private information of the forecasters could be due to their private knowledge of the model they use to
process the available public information.
6In their classic study on the rationality of forecasts using data from the NBER-ASA survey of pro-
fessional forecasters (later to be called the Survey of Professional Forecasters), Keane and Runkle (1990)
found that differences in individual forecasts cannot be explained by publicly available information. They
inferred that differences in forecasts are due to asymmetric information, but this conclusion rests on the
maintained assumption of honest forecasting. The observed forecast dispersion might also be the outcome
of strategic behavior.
7For empirical evidence of partisan bias of equity analysts we refer to Michaely and Womack (1999),
Hong and Kubik (2003), and references therein. For theoretical investigations we refer to Crawford and
Sobel (1982) and Morgan and Stocken (2003).
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x = hi+(x− hi) is necessarily more volatile than the honest forecast hi when the forecast-
ers’ information is noisy, V (x) = V (hi)+V (x− hi) > V (hi). Equivalently, the realization x
is negatively correlated with the forecast error hi−x = ν (µ− x) / (τ i + ν)+τ iεi/ (τ i + ν).
The shock hi−E (hi|x) = τ iεi/ (τ i + ν), is instead uncorrelated with x and with the shocks
of other forecasters. The expected forecast E (hi|x) is commonly estimated by the con-
sensus forecast, equal to the unweighted average of forecasts f¯ =
Pn
i=1 fi/n across all
forecasters.
Third, forecasts are more dispersed and less accurate in years with relatively little
public information. This observation is consistent with a finding reported by Zarnowitz
and Lambros (1987) on the ASA-NBER survey of professional forecasters. In addition to
point forecasts, that survey initially asked forecasters to report probability distributions.
Zarnowitz and Lambros document that forecast dispersion is positively correlated with a
measure of forecast uncertainty. Likewise, in the data of our Figure 1, when regressing
the standard deviation of the forecasts on the absolute error of the consensus forecast, we
find a coefficient of .105 with standard error .058. There is a negative correlation between
accuracy and dispersion.
Finally, the honest forecast hi(si) has the key statistical property of being uncorrelated
with its forecast error hi(si)− x, since
E {E (x|si) [E (x|si)− x]} = E {E (x|si)E[E (x|si)− x|si]} = 0. (2)
According to this orthogonality property, the honest forecast does not carry information
about its forecast error. Orthogonality may seem a necessary property of rational forecasts,
but such is not the case. Asymmetric scoring rules generally result in forecasts violating
the property, as noted by Granger (1969) and Zellner (1986).8 Instead, in our model we
maintain symmetry and examine whether strategic factors lead rational players to make
non-orthogonal forecasts.
While we use a Bayesian framework, we briefly consider the benchmark case of classi-
cal forecasting. Forecaster i’s maximum likelihood estimator (MLE), maximizing gi (si|xi)
over xi, is si. The maximum likelihood forecast violates the orthogonality property,
since E[si(si−x)] = E[(x+ εi) εi] = 1/τ i > 0. The MLE can also be seen as resulting from
Bayesian updating when the prior distribution on the state is the improper uniform distri-
bution on the real line. However, forecasters typically share some pre-existing information
about the variable to be predicted, as confirmed by a number of empirical studies (e.g.,
Welch, 2000). The presence of prior information drives the results of our two theories.
8Granger (1999) defines generalized forecast errors for any given loss function and notes that these
errors satisfy orthogonality.
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4 Reputational cheap talk
Forecasters are subject to the informal (or subjective) evaluation of financial and labor
markets. Forecasters who appear to have access to better information can command higher
compensation and have improved career prospects. The theory we develop in this section
captures the fact that the market uses all the publicly available information to evaluate
the forecasters’ talents. This information typically includes the forecasts and the ex-post
realization of the state. In turn, the forecasters want the market to believe that they are
highly talented.
Reputational forecasting is a game of cheap talk (Crawford and Sobel, 1982), since a
forecaster’s payoff depends on the forecast released only indirectly, through the evaluation
performed by the market. Our reputational cheap talk game builds on elements first
introduced by Holmström (1999) and Scharfstein and Stein (1990). Scharfstein and Stein
consider a dynamic game in which better informed forecasters have conditionally more
correlated signals, but here we focus on the static game with conditionally independent
signals. Our model (further developed by Ottaviani and Sørensen, 2005) offers a new theory
of herd behavior, which does not rely on the presence of multiple forecasters. In the context
of the normal model analyzed here, we are able to obtain a sharp characterization of the
deviation incentives and discuss the distributional properties of the equilibrium forecasts.
4.1 Model
We extend the information structure of Section 2 by introducing a parameter ti > 0 to
represent the unknown talent of forecaster i. All talents ti and the state x are statistically
independent. The market and the forecasters share the common prior on the state, x ∼
N (µ, 1/ν), and the non-degenerate prior belief pi(ti) on the talent. Conditional on x and
ti, signal si is generated by a symmetric location experiment with scale parameter ti. The
signal’s density is g˜ (si|x, ti) = tigˆ (ti|si − x|) /2, in which gˆ is a density on [0,∞). We
retain the assumption that si|x ∼ N (x, 1/τ), so the primitives gˆ and p are restricted to
satisfy gi(si|x) =
R∞
0
g˜ (si|x, ti) pi (ti) dti. A greater talent is associated with smaller signal
errors, i.e., the likelihood ratio g˜ (si|x, ti) /g˜ (si|x, t0i) is increasing in |si− x| when ti < t0i.9
We simplify the game by eliminating all payoff interaction among the forecasters. First,
the private signals si are independent conditional on x and t1, . . . , tn, so that forecaster
9As noted by Lehmann (1955, Example 3.3), this property is equivalent to the log-concavity in a of
gˆ (ea). Equivalently, the elasticity εgˆ0 (ε) /gˆ (ε) is decreasing in ε. The example gˆ (ε) = K1 exp
¡
−ε4/12
¢
and pi (ti) = K2iτ
3/2
i t
−4
i exp
¡
−3τ2i t−4i /4
¢
satisfies all our assumptions. In this example, si|x, ti has an
exponential power distribution (Box and Tiao, 1973, page 517).
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i cannot signal anything to the market about tj for j 6= i. Second, forecaster i’s payoff
function does not depend on the posterior beliefs about tj for j 6= i. Hence, we can focus
on a single forecaster’s problem in isolation and remove the subscript i.
The reputational cheap talk game proceeds as follows. First, the forecaster observes
the private signal s and issues the forecast (or message) m. Second, the market observes
the true state x and then uses (m,x) to update the belief p (t) about the forecaster’s talent.
To update the beliefs about the forecaster’s talent, the market formulates a conjecture
about the forecaster’s strategy mapping s into m and derives the message distribution
denoted by ϕ (m|x, t). The market uses Bayes’ rule to calculate the posterior reputation
p (t|m,x) = ϕ (m|t, x) p(t)/ϕ(m|x), where ϕ (m|x) = R∞
0
ϕ (m|t, x) p(t) dt. We assume that
the forecaster’s payoff from reputation p (t|m,x) is given by the expected value expression
W (m|x) = R∞
0
u(t)p (t|m,x) dt. Since an expert with greater talent t receives more ac-
curate signals, we assume that u is strictly increasing. When reporting the message m,
the forecaster does not yet know the state x, but believes it to be distributed according
to q (x|s). The forecaster then chooses the message m that maximizes the expected value
U(m|s) = R∞−∞W (m|x)q (x|s) dx.
4.2 Deviation
We first show that truthtelling cannot be an equilibrium. Consider what happens when
the market conjectures that the forecaster reports the honest m = h (s). As represented in
Figure 2, a forecaster with signal s > µ believes that the state is normally distributed with
meanE (x|s), a weighted average of the prior mean µ and the signal s. If the forecaster were
to honestly report h (s) = E (x|s), the market would invert this strategy and infer the true
signal s = h−1 (h (s)) > E (x|s). Below, we show formally that a signal s closer to the state
x is better news about the talent t and so results in a higher forecaster payoff. To minimize
the average distance between the signal inferred by the market and the best predictor of the
state, the forecaster then wishes to be perceived as having signal sˆ = E (x|s). We conclude
that if the market believes that the forecast reflects truthfully the forecaster’s posterior
expectation, then the forecaster deviates by reporting d (s) = h(h (s)) = E[x|sˆ = E (x|s)].
In this deviation, forecasters are biased towards the prior mean.
Proposition 1 If the market conjectures honest forecasting h (s), the forecaster shades
the forecast towards the prior mean by reporting
d (s) = h (h (s)) =
µ
τ
τ + ν
¶2
s+
"
1−
µ
τ
τ + ν
¶2#
µ. (3)
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Prior
N(µ, 1
ν
)
Posterior
N(E(x|s), 1
ν+τ
)
µ E(x|s) s
x
Figure 2. Optimal deviation in the reputational cheap talk model.
Another interpretation of the conservative deviation is based on the following logic.
A forecaster who receives a signal s above the prior mean µ, concludes that the average
forecast error E (ε|s) = ν (s− µ) / (τ + ν) is positive. The forecaster then optimally devi-
ates by removing this expected error from the true signal and so pretending to have signal
sˆ = s−E (ε|s) = E (x|s).
The incentive to deviate relies on the simultaneous presence of private and public
information. Indeed, if the signal is perfectly informative (i.e., in the limit as τ → ∞),
the posterior expectation puts zero weight on the prior belief, E (x|s) = s, and x = s with
probability one. Similarly, in the absence of prior information (i.e., in the limit as ν → 0),
the posterior expectation is again equal to the signal. In these two extreme cases, there is
no incentive to deviate, d (s) = s, so that truthtelling is an equilibrium.
According to Proposition 1, sophisticated forecasters who are taken at face value report
conservative forecasts, in order to fool the market into believing that they have more
accurate signals. This characterization of the deviation incentive is relevant for several
reasons. Understanding the pressure on forecasters to deviate from honesty shows us why
truthtelling is impossible and sheds light on out-of-equilibrium forces. If the forecaster has
mixed incentives, caring about both her reputation and forecast accuracy, the incentive
to deviate from honesty can induce a conservative bias in equilibrium. Finally, deviation
incentives persist when the market is not fully rational.
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4.3 Equilibrium
According to Proposition 1, honest forecasting is incompatible with equilibrium. As in any
cheap talk game, ruling out truthtelling implies that there is no fully-separating equilib-
rium. By definition, in a fully separating equilibrium, the strategy that maps signals into
forecasts can be inverted. As before, the market then infers the signal, so that the fore-
caster with signal s wishes to deviate to the forecast corresponding to signal s0 = E (x|s),
which is different from s whenever s 6= µ.
There exists an equilibrium with complete pooling, as is common in cheap talk games.
In such a “babbling” equilibrium, the forecaster issues the same message m regardless of
the signal received. Any message the market receives is then interpreted as carrying no
information about the signal. More generally, in equilibrium only part of the forecaster’s
information is conveyed to the market. Equilibrium forecasting must necessarily involve
some degree of pooling of signals into messages.
Due to the cheap talk nature of the game, the actual language used to send equilibrium
messages is indeterminate. But the market can easily translate message m into the best
estimate of the state that incorporates the information contained in that message, namely
E (x|m). In this natural language, the forecaster is effectively communicating E (x|m) to
the market. Since it is a conditional expectation of x, this forecast is uncorrelated with
its error. In this sense, the reputational equilibrium forecast satisfies the orthogonality
property. We conclude:
Proposition 2 (Coarseness in Reputational Equilibrium) There is no reputational
cheap talk equilibrium in which information is fully revealed. Any equilibrium can be defined
with a language such that the forecast has the orthogonality property.
We now show by example that there exists a partially informative equilibrium. It
involves a binary forecasting strategy, in which the forecaster reports a “high” message
mH whenever the signal s weakly exceeds a threshold and a “low” message mL otherwise.
In fact, our binary equilibrium strategy is symmetric, because the threshold signal equals
the average signal µ:
Proposition 3 (Binary Reputational Equilibrium) There exists a symmetric binary
reputational cheap talk equilibrium. This equilibrium is the unique equilibrium in binary
strategies. If the forecasters use the natural language, we have mL = µ−
p
2τ/πν (ν + τ)
and mH = µ+
p
2τ/πν (ν + τ).
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4.4 Discussion
The theory of reputational cheap talk relies on the fact that the market rationally uses
all the information available ex post to evaluate the forecaster. Suppose that instead the
market commits ex ante to evaluate the forecaster by comparing the forecast m with the
realization x, according to the magnitude of the error, |m− x|. In this case, the forecaster’s
optimal strategy is to honestly report m = E (x|s). This outcome is essentially the default
case of honest forecasting as explained in Section 2. This outcome also results if the market
(incorrectly) believes the forecaster’s message to be equal to her signal, m = s.
We now relate our results to previous work in the agency literature. Brandenburger and
Polak (1996) consider a privately informed agent who makes an investment decision with
the aim of obtaining the most favorable assessment by the stock market. In their model
the market assesses the profitability of the exogenously coarse (in fact, binary) decision
already before the true state is realized. Despite the model differences, in both models
agents have an incentive to deviate conservatively.
At a superficial level, the deviation result obtained in Proposition 1 is reminiscent
of Prendergast’s (1993) “yes-men” effect, but is driven by different forces and essentially
goes in the opposite direction. While in Prendergast’s model the agent does not sufficiently
move away from her information about the principal’s signal, in our model the agent does
not move away from the prior mean. By identifying the principal’s signal with the ex-post
(noisy) realization of the state, it is seen that Prendergast’s deviation report is biased
toward the state, rather than the prior. In both models, in equilibrium the agent cannot
transmit all her information.
Our result on the direction of the deviation incentives relies on the assumption that
forecasters do not have superior information about their forecasting talent compared to the
market. This assumption is questionable in a dynamic setting since dishonest forecasters
would learn faster about their precision than the market. If the forecaster has private
information about their forecasting talent, the model becomes one of two-dimensional
signaling (cf. Trueman, 1994, for a first analysis). The addition of this second dimension
of private information, introduces a new signalling incentive. Intuitively, since forecasters
of higher talent t have posterior expectations E (x|s, t) more variable around the prior
mean, the attempt to signal talent generates an incentive to exaggerate.10
This exaggeration tendency is isolated in Prendergast and Stole’s (1996) managerial
reputational signaling model without ex-post information about the state. When evalu-
10As argued by Lim (2002), a forecaster who knows her own ability has also an incentive to underreact
to new public information.
11
ating forecasters, in our model the market has instead access to additional information
about the state, such as its ex-post realization or the contemporaneous forecasts of others.
The addition of such ex-post information introduces the new conservatism effect isolated
in Proposition 1.11 Overall, concerns for absolute accuracy drive forecasters to be conserv-
ative if they do not know their ability, but to exaggerate if they do know it well enough.12
Rather than performing direct tests of reputational cheap talk, most of the existing
empirical literature provides indirect evidence of reputational concerns based on hetero-
geneity across forecasters. Lamont (2002) finds that older forecasters tend to deviate more
from the consensus. Chevalier and Ellison (1999) find that older mutual fund managers
have bolder investment strategies. Hong et al. (2000) conclude that the lower accuracy of
older stock analysts is due to the fact that they move earlier. In Section 6 we return to
alternative methodologies for detecting strategic behavior in forecasts.
5 Forecasting contest
Our first theory posited that the market optimally evaluates ex post the forecasting talent
based on all the information available. In many instances however, there are different
mechanisms in place for rewarding successful forecasts. For example, forecasters often
participate in contests with prizes allocated to the best performers. Even in the absence of
monetary prizes, the publicity effect for the winner can be large. In the much publicized
Wall Street Journal semi-annual forecasting contest, the most accurate forecaster over the
previous six months is typically rewarded with a write-up.13
Note that a rational observer should take into account not just whether a forecaster has
won a tournament, but also the absolute size of the forecast error. If the processing power
of the observing public were unlimited, the business media could simply publish a list of
forecasts and realized outcomes, instead of creating rankings and contests. However, the
rank-order information is particularly salient for the problem of evaluating the quality of
11For an example of reputational signaling with bounded rationality, see Zitzewitz’s (2001b) model where
the market evaluates forecast quality using a simple econometric technique. In his model, forecasters have
information on their own ability, introducing an incentive to exaggerate.
12As also suggested by Avery and Chevalier (1999), young managers with little private information
about their own ability should be conservative; older managers would instead exaggerate. This contrasts
with Prendergast and Stole’s (1996) prediction of impetuous youngsters and jaded old-timers when the
same manager makes repeated observable decisions with an unobserved but constant state.
13See Stekler (1987) for an early study of the relative accuracy of forecasts. A number of rankings
are available on line. For example, Validea (www.validea.com), BigTipper.com (www.bigtipper.com)
and BulldogResearch.com (www.bulldogresearch.com) track stock recommendations made by Wall Street
professionals and then rank the analysts based on the performance of their selections. Forecasting contests
are run also for non-economic variables (see e.g., the National Collegiate Weather Forecasting Contest).
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forecasts. This salience may stem from the behavioral notion (e.g., Kahneman, 1973) that
the public pays limited attention to forecasters.14 It is easier for people to keep in mind
who is an “all star” analyst, or who came first in a contest, than specific details about
forecast accuracy. As a result, forecasters are concerned about their relative accuracy.
In this section, we consider a symmetric simultaneous winner-take-all contest with
a large number of forecasters. In this forecasting contest, the participating forecasters
simultaneously submit individual forecasts based on their private information. A prize is
awarded to the forecaster whose forecast is closest to the realized state. As opposed to
what happens in our reputational model, in a forecasting contest the market commits ex
ante to a particular reward scheme.
There is remarkably little previous work on forecasters’ behavior in contests. Steele
and Zidek (1980) are the first to study a sequential forecasting contest among two pri-
vately informed forecasters. They assume away game-theoretic considerations by suppos-
ing truthful reporting by the first forecaster. After observing the first forecast, the second
guesser faces a simple decision problem and has a clear advantage. Indeed, Bernhardt
and Kutsoati (2004) confirm empirically that financial analysts who release late earnings
forecasts tend to overshoot the consensus forecast in the direction of their private infor-
mation. Laster et al. (1999) study a winner-take-all simultaneous forecasting contest in
which all forecasters share the same (public) information. We instead allow forecasters to
have private information on the state.15 In a forecasting contest, a forecaster’s payoff is
the probability that the realized state is closer to her forecast than to any other forecast.
This probability is equivalent to the market share or fraction of votes to be maximized in
Hotelling’s (1929) pure location game.16
5.1 Model
The forecasting contest proceeds as follows. First, forecasters observe their private signals
si of common precision τ and simultaneously submit their forecasts ci. Once the true state
x is publicly observed, the forecaster whose forecast ci turns out to be closest to x wins
a prize proportional to the total number of forecasters participating in the contest. We
14For a broader discussion of limited attention and its implications for finance, see e.g., Hirshleifer and
Teoh (2003).
15There is no clear reason to reward accurate forecasters in the absence of heterogeneous private infor-
mation.
16An extensive literature in economics and political science studies versions of this game without private
information. As it is well known (cf. Osborne and Pitchik, 1986), equilibria in this classic game crucially
depend on the number of players and often involve mixed strategies. A forecasting contest is a version
of Hotelling’s simultaneous location game in which the forecasters (firms or politicians) have private
information on the distribution of the state (location of consumers or voters).
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consider the limit game as the number of forecasters tends to infinity.
The expected payoff of forecaster i with signal si when reporting forecast ci is
U(ci|si) = q(ci|si)
γ(ci|ci) , (4)
where γ(c|x) is the density of the forecasts released by all forecasters conditional on state
x, with full support on the real line. Issuing forecast ci, forecaster i wins only if x = ci,
which occurs with chance q(ci|si). Conditional on being on the mark, the prize is divided
among all the winning forecasters, and their density computed at x = ci is equal to γ(ci|ci).
-
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Figure 3. Optimal deviation in the forecasting contest model.
5.2 Deviation
We now show that honest forecasting is not an equilibrium. Let us consider a single
forecaster with signal s competing against forecasters who are all reporting their honest
forecasts. Without loss of generality, we focus on s > µ as depicted in Figure 3. What is
the best reply for such a forecaster?
According to (4), the best forecast maximizes the ratio between the probability of
winning the first prize and the number of forecasters with whom this prize is shared.
First, the probability of winning conditional on signal s is equal to the posterior belief
on the state x|s, the normal distribution centered at E (x|s) and depicted on the right in
Figure 3. Second, the curve on the left in Figure 3 depicts γ(x|x), the denominator of
the ratio maximized by the forecaster. This represents how the mass of forecasters with
correct forecasts changes as a function of the state x. The shape of γ(x|x) depends on the
weight assigned by the other forecasters to their signal. Since the other forecasters put a
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positive weight on the prior mean, γ(x|x) is bell shaped around µ.17
Figure 3 illustrates that the probability of winning is flat at the honestE (x|s), while the
frequency of correct forecasts is decreasing in the distance |x− µ|. At the honest E (x|s),
it is then optimal for the forecaster to move away from the prior mean µ toward the private
signal s, because the second-order loss resulting from lower probability of winning is more
than compensated by the first-order gain due to reduced competition.
Proposition 4 (Exaggeration in Contest Deviation) If all other forecasters use the
honest strategy h(s), the best response in the contest for forecaster i is to exaggerate.
The optimal deviation forecast is a weighted average of si and µ, but the weight on
µ is lower than in the honest forecast. The contest deviation forecast is then positively
correlated with its error: when x is above µ the forecast is too high on average.
5.3 Equilibrium
Having established that honest forecasting is incompatible with equilibrium, we now turn
to characterize the symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium. At such an equilibrium, each fore-
caster for every signal si best replies to her conjecture about the opponents’ distribution
γ (c|x), and this conjecture is correctly derived from the opponents’ strategies.
Proposition 5 (Exaggeration in Contest Equilibrium) For any values of ν > 0 and
τ > 0 the contest has a unique symmetric linear equilibrium with strategy c(s) = Cs +
(1− C)µ with C ∈ (0, 1). Forecasters put more weight on their private information than
according to the honest conditional expectation: C =
¡√
τ 2 + 4ντ − τ
¢
/2ν > τ/ (ν + τ).
Forecasters differentiate themselves from their competitors by putting excessive weight
on their signals. As in the honest forecast, the weight on the signal is increasing in τ and
decreasing in ν. This weight is larger than in the honest forecast, so the contest gives an
incentive to move away from µ.18 The symmetric equilibrium strikes a balance: opponents
disperse themselves to such an extent that forecaster i is happy to reply precisely with the
same dispersion. The equilibrium forecast is positively correlated with its error.
17When the other forecasters put zero weight on the prior (e.g., because they are perfectly informed),
γ(x|x) is constantly equal to 1. More generally, γ(x|x) is not a probability density function of x.
18Even though a best reply to honesty does not exist for all parameter values, the equilibrium in linear
strategies exists for all parameter values. Intuitively, with increased weight on their signal, the opponents
are less concentrated around µ, mitigating the incentive to move away from µ.
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5.4 Discussion
In the absence of private information (τ = 0), the only symmetric equilibrium is in mixed
strategies as in Laster et al. (1999) and Osborne and Pitchik (1986), who find that with
infinitely many symmetrically informed players the distribution of equilibrium locations
replicates the common prior distribution about x. The addition of private information
has the desirable effect of inducing a symmetric location equilibrium in pure rather than
mixed strategies.
The contest equilibrium satisfies C < 1, so the forecast is not as extreme as the
maximum likelihood estimate (MLE). However, the MLE results in the contest when the
prior on the state x is improper, i.e., uniform on the real line. If the opponents forecast
c = s, their forecasts are normally distributed around x, and the term γ (c|c) is constant
in c. Forecaster i’s best reply will then be ci = si, since the constant term γ (c|c) does not
distort the forecaster’s problem. Truthtelling by all forecasters is then an equilibrium in
the absence of public information. Thus, the contest distortion depends on the presence
of prior information that anchors the forecasts of the opponents around µ. The tendency
of opponents to cluster around the prior mean drives forecasters away from it.
6 Empirical testing
We now turn to discuss how to empirically test our theories. In Section 6.1 we revisit
the orthogonality test presented in equation (2) and discuss the implications of recent
empirical work in light of our theories. In Section 6.2 we consider the effect of the strategic
incentives on distributional properties of the forecasts.19
6.1 Orthogonality
Except for the reputational equilibrium forecasts, we have found linear forecasting rules
of the form fi (si) = Fisi + (1− Fi)µ for some constant weight Fi between 0 and 1. The
conditional distribution of the linear forecast is then
fi|x ∼ N
¡
Fix+ (1− Fi)µ, F 2i /τ i
¢
. (5)
19To directly test for the implications of strategic behavior, we could compare non-anonymous with
anonymous forecasting data. In anonymous surveys the authorship of individual forecasts is not disclosed.
The mere existence of anonymous surveys (starting in 1946 with the Livingston Survey) presupposes a
belief that anonymous forecasts are more honest. As reported by Croushore (1993): “This anonymity is
designed to encourage people to provide their best forecasts, without fearing the consequences of making
forecasts errors. In this way, an economist can feel comfortable in forecasting what she really believes
will happen.” Yet, Stark’s (1993) empirical analysis of the anonymous Survey of Professional Forecasters
confirms that forecasters in anonymous surveys face similar incentives as in non-anonymous surveys.
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We have already noted that under honesty the forecast is uncorrelated with its error fi−x
when Fi = τ i/ (ν + τ i). If forecasters report honestly, their error cannot be predicted from
the forecast. The contest and reputational deviation forecasts fail instead to inherit this
property, so that once a forecast has been released the sign of its error can be predicted.
Proposition 6 For the linear forecasting rules of the form (5) the correlation of the fore-
cast and its error has the same sign as Fi− τ i/ (τ i + ν). The correlation is positive in the
contest and negative in the reputational deviation. The reputational equilibrium forecast
satisfies orthogonality, but is not efficient.
A typical empirical test for the hypothesis that the forecasts are conditional expecta-
tions (E (x|Ii) for some information set Ii) is based on regressing the realized forecast error
on the forecasts. Most studies report a positive correlation of the forecast and its error,
consistent with the prediction of our contest theory. For example, Batchelor and Dua
(1992) find that forecasters put too little weight on the forecasts previously released by
other forecasters (or, equivalently in our model, on the prior mean). However, Keane and
Runkle (1990 and 1998) question the statistical significance of any bias, as they note that
the tests are not as powerful as is usually assumed once the correlation between forecast
errors across forecasters is properly taken into account (see also Section 7.1 below).
When deriving the correlation of the forecast and its error, we have treated the prior
mean µ as a parameter. Empirical work, instead, must control for the prior mean. Recently,
Zitzewitz (2001a) and Bernhardt et al. (2004) perfect the orthogonality methodology to
fully account for the presence of prior information and correlation of forecast errors. They
rewrite fi = Fisi + (1− Fi)µ as fi − µ = Fi (si − µ) = (Fi/Hi) (hi − µ) where hi is the
honest forecast and Hi = τ i/ (τ i + ν) is the honest weight on the signal, and condition on
all publicly available information at the moment of forecasting.
These findings point clearly toward the presence of exaggeration rather than herding in
the earning forecasts released by I/B/E/S analysts. Exaggeration is in line with the equi-
librium of our forecasting contest, but is inconsistent with the deviation or the equilibrium
of our reputational cheap talk model. As argued by Zitzewitz (2001b), the observed exag-
geration is also consistent with an alternative version of the reputational signaling model
in which forecasters are privately informed about their own ability (as in Trueman’s, 1994,
model) and are evaluated according to an econometric technique.
6.2 Forecast variability
We now turn to the statistical properties of an individual’s forecast f . We derive the
conditional variance of the forecast under the different theories.
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The linear forecasts’ weights F on the signal implied by the theories all depend on τ
only through the relative signal precision ρ ≡ τ/ν, the precision of private information
relative to the prior precision. Apart from a common scaling factor equal to the variance
of the prior distribution, 1/ν, all variances below can be written as a function of ρ.
Proposition 7 The conditional variances are: V (h|x) = (1/ν)ρ/(1 + ρ)2 for the honest
forecast, V (d|x) = (1/ν) ρ3/ (1 + ρ)4 for the reputational deviation forecast, and V (c|x) =
(1/ν)
³
2 + ρ−
p
ρ2 + 4ρ
´
/2 for the contest equilibrium forecast. The reputational binary
equilibrium forecast satisfies V (r|x) ≤ (1/ν) 2ρ/π (1 + ρ) = V (r|x = µ).
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Figure 4. Conditional forecast variances as functions of the relative preci-
sion ρ, fixing ν = 1. The solid line shows honesty’s V (h|x), the dotted line
the reputational deviation’s V (d|x), the line with dots and dashes the reputa-
tional equilibrium’s upper bound V (r|x = µ), and the dashed line the contest
equilibrium’s V (c|x).
As shown in Figure 4, the honest forecast has vanishing variance both when the fore-
casters are very poorly informed (and thus forecast near µ) and when they are very well
informed (and thus forecast the realized x well). Similar properties hold for the repu-
tational forecasts.20 In general, herding or exaggeration can be inferred from forecast
20When the private signals become very informative, ρ→∞, then for any fixed x > µ, the reputational
forecast becomes concentrated near µ+
p
2/ν, and has vanishing variance. This fact is not evident from the
upper bound V (r|x = µ) displayed in Figure 4. This upper bound corresponds to the variance conditional
on the particular signal realization s = µ.
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dispersion only after controlling for the quality of the forecaster’s information. This point
is also emphasized by Zitzewitz (2001a).
In the limit as the private signals become uninformative (ρ → 0), the contest makes
a markedly different prediction. In this limit, the distribution of equilibrium forecast
locations converges to the common prior distribution about the state, with conditional
variance equal to 1/ν > 0. This result is consistent with the findings of Osborne and
Pitchik (1986) and Laster et al. (1999), obtained for the limit case of Hotelling’s location
game with a large number of players. In cases with imprecise private signals, empirical
tests among the theories could build on this finding.
7 Theoretical extensions
We now extend the baseline model in two directions relevant for empirical work. In Sec-
tion 7.1 we allow for common errors in the signals and in Section 7.2 we consider simulta-
neous forecasting of multiple variables.
7.1 Common error
As stressed by Keane and Runkle (1998), the significant positive correlation among the
residuals in the orthogonality regression indicates the presence of a common error in the
forecasts. Since the forecasts are released well in advance, there are often unpredictable
changes to the variables after the forecasts are submitted. In addition, often realizations
are observed with noise. To check the robustness of our results, in this section we modify
the model by allowing for the presence of common errors.
Suppose that the market does not observe x but only the imperfect signal y = x + ε0
before evaluating the forecasters. Thus, the forecaster’s rewards are defined in terms of the
new target variable y rather than x. Assume that x, ε0, ε1, . . . , εn are independent normal
variables, and let τ 0 denote the precision of ε0. The signal is si = x + εi = y + εi − ε0.
Conditional on y, the relevant signal errors ε1 − ε0, . . . , εn − ε0 are now correlated as
suggested by Keane and Runkle. Yet, the honest forecast of y is the same as the honest
forecast of x, i.e., E (y|si) = E (x+ ε0|si) = E (x|si).
Proposition 8 Propositions 1—4 continue to hold with common error, with suitable mod-
ification of the closed form expressions. If the noise in the common error is sufficiently
small (i.e., τ 0/ν is large compared to τ/ν), there is a linear equilibrium with exaggeration
in the forecasting contest.
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7.2 Multiple dimensions
In some applications, forecasters are evaluated on the basis of several contemporaneous
forecasts or their entire record of past forecasts. To simplify the presentation, in our
baseline model we have focused on the one-dimensional case, in which forecasters are
evaluated on the basis of a single forecast of one variable. We now extend our normal
learning model to multi-variate settings in which the evaluation is made on the basis of a
number of different variables.
We extend the model by letting g˜ (s|x, t) = tgˆ (t||x− s||) /2, in which the state x and
the signal s are multivariate and the talent t is univariate. The property that signals closer
to the state are better news about the talent is retained, so that Proposition 1 and 3 con-
tinue to hold. In addition, γ (x|x) is a multivariate, bell-shaped function centered on µ and
the posterior q (x|s) is a multivariate, bell-shaped density around E (x|s). Proposition 4
then continues to hold. In conclusion, the strategic distortions identified here hold more
generally for multi-dimensional states, signals, and forecasts.
8 Impact of forecasts
In this section, we discuss the impact of forecasts on market expectations and prices in
a financial setting. Our theories are general with respect to the interpretation of the
forecasted state variable x. For concreteness, we apply the model to forecasting stock
prices, but the results are also valid for forecasts of exchange rates (e.g., Frankel and
Froot, 1987) and other macroeconomic variables (e.g., Romer and Romer, 2000).
We first extend our baseline model to represent the pricing of an asset with funda-
mental value V , which is partly explained by the forecasted state x = V + εx. The value
has prior mean µ and precision νV . The timing is as follows. First, as in our baseline
model, the forecasters simultaneously report the forecasts f1, f2, ..., fn based on their pri-
vate signals s1, s2, ..., sn, with si = x + εi. Second, the market observes the realization of
the public signal y = V + εy and determines the asset’s price as the conditional expecta-
tion, P = E (V |y, f1, . . . , fn). Third, the state is realized, x = V + εx. We assume that
V, εy, εx, ε1, . . . , εn are independent normal variables, that all of the error terms have mean
zero, and that εi has precision τ i. The precision of x then satisfies 1/ν = 1/νV + 1/τx.
We address two issues. First, we study how market prices react to the release of
forecasts (Section 8.1). Second, we analyze strategic forecasting in a modified version of
the model in which the forecasters target the market price P (Section 8.2).
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8.1 Price reaction
A perfectly rational market should adjust for the biases induced by strategic forecast-
ing. In all of the linear forecasts, there is a one-to-one mapping between the forecasts
and the private signals, so the market can fully recover the forecasters’ private signals.
Since all variables are normally distributed, P is then a weighted average of E (V |y) and
E (x|f1, . . . , fn). Likewise, E (x|f1, . . . , fn) is a weighted average of the honest forecasts
E (x|f1) , . . . , E (x|fn).
If rational, the market correctly adjusts for the strategic distortions present in the
forecasts. If the forecast function is invertible, a rational market is able to recover the
signal and form the correct posterior expectation. Hence, the predictions for asset price
reactions are identical regardless of the particular forecast function used, provided that
the forecast is invertible. Only the reputational equilibrium forecast is not invertible, and
its different statistical properties are given in Proposition 3.
Consider an outside observer (such as an empiricist) who analyzes the price reaction to a
forecast by incorrectly assuming that this forecast is honest rather than strategic. Such an
observer would wrongly conclude that the market overreacts to conservative reputational
deviation forecasts, and underreact to exaggerated contest forecasts.21
8.2 Forecasting prices
We now turn to a variant of the model relevant to the study of financial analysts. Suppose
that the target variable of the forecasts is not x but rather the asset price P , and that the
forecasters are evaluated on the basis of their ability to predict P . Thus, P plays the role
of x in the payoff functions of the forecasters. For simplicity, we make again the symmetry
assumption that all forecasters have equally precise signals, i.e., τ i = τ for all i = 1, . . . , n.
In this setting, honest forecasting of P is more complicated because the forecasts di-
rectly influence the distribution of P . As long as the forecasters’ strategies are fully
invertible, the symmetry assumption implies that P = αyy + αss¯ + αµµ where s¯ is the
average forecasters’ signal, which the market extracts by inverting the forecast strategy.
The parameters αy, αs, αµ ∈ (0, 1) sum to one, and are determined by the precisions of the
public signal y and the private signal summary statistic s¯ relative to the precision of the
prior belief about V .
21We refer to Gleason and Lee (2003) for a recent empirical analysis of price reactions to forecast
revisions.
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Proposition 9 There exists a rational expectations equilibrium for honest forecasting of
P in linear strategies, h(s) = Hs+ (1−H)µ, in which
H = (αy + αs)
τ
τ + ν
+
αs
n
µ
ν
τ + ν
¶
∈ (0, 1) . (6)
Relative to this benchmark, the reputational and limit contest theories have similar prop-
erties to those reported in Proposition 8.
The equilibrium in honest strategies is identical to the one in equation (1) when αs = 0
and αy = 1. Otherwise, two effects pull the forecast away from the honest forecast of x.
First, P depends positively on the forecasts of the opponents. This yields a beauty contest
effect which encourages forecasters to attach greater weight to their private signal about
x. Second, the estimate P is systematically closer to the prior mean µ than the signal x
which the forecasters have information about, and therefore there is an incentive to attach
less weight to the private signal. The same effects influence our two strategic theories, but
relative to the honest benchmark the properties are the same as before.
9 Conclusion
In this paper we have formulated and contrasted two distinct theories of strategic fore-
casting within the normal model. In the process we have advanced our understanding
of the forces that might drive informed agents to deviate from honest reporting of their
conditional expectations. Misreporting results from the effect on individuals’ payoff of the
subtle interaction of the private information available to each individual with the public
prior information available to the market and commonly shared by all agents.
Our first theory posits that the market has all the information contained in the forecasts
and the realization of the state and uses it to ex post optimally evaluate the forecasters.
We have assumed that better informed forecasters observe signals on average closer to the
state and that forecasters who are reputed to be better informed have a higher payoff. We
have shown that forecasters wish to appear to have received a signal equal to the posterior
expectation of the state conditional on the signal actually received. In the presence of
public information, the observed signal is necessarily different from the posterior expecta-
tion. If the market naively believes that forecasters are honest, forecasters then shade their
forecasts toward the prior mean. If the market is fully aware of the forecasters’ strategic
incentives, equilibrium forecasts are imprecise but not shaded.22
22In reality, competition among forecasters combines elements of both theories. For example, Institu-
tional Investors ranks analysts based on the opinions of large institutional investors. See Ottaviani and
Sørensen (2005) for results on relative reputational concerns.
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Our second theory posits that competition for best accuracy takes place with pre-
specified rules. The evaluation in a forecasting contest is ex post optimal when the market
can only observe the accuracy ranking, possibly due to limited attention. Since the fore-
casters share the same public information, competition is highest when the state turns out
to be equal to the prior mean. At the posterior expectation, a small deviation away from
the prior mean results in a first-order gain due to reduced competition and a second-order
loss due to lower probability of winning. Equilibrium forecasts in a winner-take-all contest
are then excessively differentiated relative to the corresponding conditional expectations.
In both the reputational and the contest theory the incentive to deviate from honesty
is driven by the property that private signals are unimodally centered around the state
and the fact that public information is available at the moment of forecasting. In the
absence of public information, honest forecasting is an equilibrium in both models. In
reality, public information is pervasive, and its presence as well as the correlation across
forecasts have posed major challenges for empirical work. Having dealt with these issues,
recent empirical studies have found a significant and strong exaggeration in the forecasts.
These findings are in line with the equilibrium of our forecasting contest.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. By observing m = h (s) and x, the market infers the
realized signal sˆ = h−1 (m) and error εˆ = sˆ − x. The updated reputation is then
p (t|m,x) = g˜ (sˆ|x, t) p (t) /g (sˆ|x). This posterior reputation inherits intuitive properties
from the assumptions imposed on g˜. First, the posterior reputation depends on m and x
only through the absolute size of the error |εˆ|. Second, a small realized absolute error is
good news about the forecaster’s talent: for any t < t0, the likelihood ratio
p (t|m,x)
p (t0|m,x) =
g˜ (sˆ|x, t)
g˜ (sˆ|x, t0)
p (t)
p (t0)
(7)
is increasing in |εˆ|. This second property and the fact that v is strictly increasing imply
(see Milgrom, 1981) that W (m|x) is a strictly decreasing function of the inferred absolute
error |εˆ|.
We now consider the best response of a forecaster with signal s. The posterior dis-
tribution on x is normal with mean h (s) and variance 1/ (ν + τ). The inferred forecast
error εˆ = h−1 (m)−x is then normally distributed with mean h−1 (m)−h (s) and variance
1/ (ν + τ). The best reply maximizes the expected value of W , or equivalently, minimizes
a symmetric loss function of the error h−1 (m) − x. The forecaster then chooses m such
that the error has mean zero, by setting h−1 (m) = h (s). ¤
Lemma 1 If a density gˆ (.) satisfies the property
gˆ (t0ε) gˆ (tε0) < gˆ (tε) gˆ (t0ε0) for ε0 > ε ≥ 0 and t0 > t, (8)
its counter-cumulative distribution satisfies it as well:h
1− Gˆ (t0ε)
i h
1− Gˆ (tε0)
i
<
h
1− Gˆ (tε)
i h
1− Gˆ (t0ε0)
i
for ε0 > ε ≥ 0 and t0 > t. (9)
Proof. Integrating (8) for ε00 > ε0, we obtain
t0gˆ (t0ε)
h
1− Gˆ (tε0)
i
< tgˆ (tε)
h
1− Gˆ (t0ε0)
i
(10)
for ε0 > ε. The left-hand side and the right-hand side of (9) are equal for ε0 = ε. By (10) we
know that the derivative of the left-hand side is larger than the derivative of the right-hand
side of (9). We conclude that (9) holds. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3. To support this equilibrium, we also need to specify the
market’s beliefs following out-of-equilibrium messages. When a message different frommL
and mH is received, the market assumes that the forecaster possesses a signal below the
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threshold, which results in the same posterior reputation as message mL. These beliefs
satisfy the requirements of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
We assume that the market conjectures a binary strategy with threshold signal sˇ.
We find ϕ (mH |x, t) =
R∞
sˇ
g˜ (s|x, t) ds = R∞
sˇ
tgˆ (t|s−x|) /2ds. This equation reduces toh
1−Gˆ(t|sˇ−x|)
i
/2 when sˇ > x and
h
1 + Gˆ(t|sˇ− x|)
i
/2 when sˇ < x, where Gˆ is the
distribution function corresponding to the density gˆ. Therefore, we have ϕ (mH |x, t) =
1−ϕ (mH |2sˇ− x, t) = ϕ (mL|2sˇ− x, t), which implies the symmetry propertyW (mH |x) =
W (mL|2sˇ− x).
When sˇ > x, it follows from Lemma 1 that message mH is worse news about the talent
than the observation that s ≥ x. Thus, we have W (mH |x) < W (mH |sˇ) for all x < sˇ.
Symmetrically, we have W (mH |x) > W (mH |sˇ) for all x > sˇ. These inequalities and
symmetry imply that W (mH |x) > W (mL|x) when x > sˇ.
We now show that when sˇ = µ, the forecaster does not wish to deviate from the
putative equilibrium strategy. By symmetry, it suffices to assume that s ≥ µ and check
that U (mH |s) ≥ U (mL|s). Using the symmetry of W , U (mH |s)− U (mL|s) isZ ∞
−∞
[W (mH |x)−W (mL|x)] q(x|s)dx=
Z ∞
µ
[W (mH |x)−W (mL|x)][q(x|s)−q(2µ−x|s)]dx. (11)
Since q (x|s) is the density of the symmetric normal distribution with a mean weakly above
µ, we have q (x|s) ≥ q (2µ− x|s) when x ≥ µ. We have already shown that W (mH |x) >
W (mL|x) when x > µ, so the integrand of the last integral in (11) is everywhere non-
negative, implying that (11) is non-negative, so that U (mH |s) ≥ U (mL|s) as desired.
To establish uniqueness of this equilibrium when binary strategies are used, we now
show that when sˇ 6= µ, the forecaster wishes to deviate from the binary strategy. With-
out loss of generality, we focus on the case sˇ > µ. We show that there exists a sig-
nal s > sˇ such that U (mH |s) < U (mL|s). As above, we have U (mH |s)−U (mL|s) =R∞
sˇ
[W (mH |x)−W (mL|x)] [q (x|s)−q (2sˇ−x|s)] dx. Also, we have again W (mH |x) >
W (mH |sˇ) for x > sˇ and q (x|s) = q (2sˇ− x|s) at x = sˇ. By properties of the normal distri-
bution, we obtain q (x|s) < q (2sˇ− x|s) for x > sˇ provided E (x|s) = (τs+ νµ) / (τ + ν) <
sˇ, which is certainly true for s slightly greater than sˇ.
We derive the analytical expressions for the equilibrium messages resulting with the
natural language. By applying the result that E (y|y > 0) = σp2/π for a normal variable
y ∼ N(0, σ2) (cf. Johnson and Kotz, 1970), we obtain that mH = E (x|s ≥ µ) is equal to
E[E (x|s) |s ≥ µ] = E ¡ τs+νµ
τ+ν
|s ≥ µ¢ = µ + τ
τ+ν
E (s− µ|s > µ) = µ +p2τ/ (πν (τ + ν)).
By symmetry, we have mL = µ−
p
2τ/ (πν (τ + ν)). ¤
Proof of Proposition 4. As derived in the text, x|si is normally distributed with
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mean (τsi+νµ)/(τ+ν) and precision τ + ν. Let us suppose that all opponents use the
linear strategy c (s) = As+ (1−A)µ, with A ∈ (0, 1]. Then c|x is normal with E (c|x) =
Ax + (1−A)µ and V (c|x) = A2/τ . Disregarding an irrelevant constant term and using
the density of the normal distribution, we find
log γ(c|c) = −τ {c− [Ac+ (1−A)µ]}
2
2A2
= −τ (1−A)
2 (c− µ)2
2A2
. (12)
This is a quadratic and concave function of c with its peak at µ. The forecaster maximizes
log qi(ci|si)− log γ(ci|ci), the difference of two quadratic and concave functions. The objec-
tive function is concave when the first concave term prevails, i.e., for τ+ν > τ (1−A)2 /A2.
When τ + ν > τ (1−A)2 /A2, the forecaster has a unique best reply ci = Bsi +
(1−B)µ, with B = τ/
£
τ + ν − τ (1−A)2 /A2
¤
∈ [τ/ (τ + ν) ,+∞). When instead τ +
ν < τ (1−A)2 /A2, there is no best response, because the incentive to move away from
µ is so strong that forecaster i wishes to go to the extremes ±∞. In the knife-edge case
τ + ν = τ (1−A)2 /A2 the objective function is linear – whenever si 6= µ, there is again
no best reply, as the forecaster wishes to go to one of the extremes.
In particular, in the honest case, A = τ/ (τ + ν), it is optimal to reply with B =
τ 2/ (τ 2 + τν − ν2), provided that ν/τ <
¡
1 +
√
5
¢
/2. We conclude that the best reply is
to exaggerate against truthtelling opponents. ¤
Proof of Proposition 5. C = 0 is not compatible with a symmetric equilibrium,
since in this case the opponents’ forecasts are all equal to c = µ, so that all replies other
than µ yield forecaster i a higher payoff. We assume then that the forecasters use linear
strategies of the form c(s) = Cs + (1− C)µ with C ∈ (0, 1]. As shown in the proof of
Proposition 4, forecaster i’s best reply is linear with weight τ/
£
τ + ν − τ (1− C)2 /C2
¤
on
the signal, provided that τ + ν > τ (1− C)2 /C2.
The fixed-point condition for a symmetric Nash equilibrium is that this linear strategy
be equal to the one posited, i.e., (1− C) τ = C2ν. Inserting the values C = 0, τ/ (τ + ν) , 1
in this quadratic equation, we conclude that there is only one positive solution, and that
this solution belongs to the interval (τ/ (τ + ν) , 1). The second-order condition for the
forecaster’s optimization requires τ + ν > τ (1− C)2 /C2. Using (1− C) τ = C2ν, this
condition reduces to τ > −νC, which is satisfied by the positive solution for C. The
solution of the quadratic equation is C =
¡√
τ 2 + 4ντ − τ
¢
/2ν. ¤
Proof of Proposition 6. For the linear forecasting rules of the form (5) the correlation
of the forecast and its error is
E [(fi−x)fi]=E {[Fiεi+(1−Fi) (µ−x)] [Fi (x+εi)+(1−Fi)µ]}=Fi
µ
Fi
τ i
−1−Fi
ν
¶
, (13)
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and so has the same sign as Fi − τ i/ (τ i + ν). ¤
Proof of Proposition 7. The linear forecasts fi = Fi (x+ εi) + (1− Fi)µ have
conditional variance F 2i /τ . Substituting the respective expressions for Fi yields the results.
The reputational equilibrium forecast ri is binomially distributed. Given x, the chance
of ri = mH is 1−Φ
¡√
τ i (µ−x)
¢
where Φ is the distribution function of the standard normal
distribution. Then ri has mean E (ri|x) = µ+
£
1− 2Φ
¡√
τ i (µ− x)
¢¤p
2τ i/ [πν (τ i + ν)]
and variance V (ri|x) = 4
£
1− Φ
¡√
τ i (µ− x)
¢¤
Φ
¡√
τ i (µ− x)
¢
2τ i/ [πν (τ i + ν)]. Since
Φ
¡√
τ i (µ− x)
¢
∈ [0, 1] for any x, we have 4
£
1− Φ
¡√
τ i (µ− x)
¢¤
Φ
¡√
τ i (µ− x)
¢
≤ 1,
where the bound is tight, being achieved for x = µ. We conclude that V (ri|x) ≤
2τ i/ [πν (τ i + ν)] = (1/ν) 2ρi/ [π (1 + ρi)]. ¤
Proof of Proposition 8. We consider first reputational cheap talk. For the deviation
analysis, suppose that all opponents j 6= i use a fully separating strategy. Besides the
forecast of forecaster i, the evaluator observes n independent signals about x, namely every
sj where j 6= i and y. From the well-known updating of beliefs on a normal state, this is
equivalent to the observation of just one more precise signal about x. So, without loss of
generality, we can imagine that y itself contains all the evaluator’s external information on
x. Since y = x+ε0 where ε0 is independent of εi and ti, x is a sufficient statistic for y when
predicting ti, so the law of iterated expectations gives pi (ti|mi, y) = E [pi (ti|mi, x) |y].
Then Ui (mi|si) =
R∞
−∞
£R∞
0
u(t)pi(ti|mi, y) dt
¤
qi(y|si) dy is
∞R
−∞
·∞R
0
u(t)
∞R
−∞
pi(ti|mi, x)q(x|y)dxdt q¸i(y|si)dy=
∞R
−∞
·∞R
0
u(t)pi(ti|mi, x)dt
·¸ ∞R
−∞
q(x|y)qi(y|si)dy d¸x.
(14)
This resembles the original expression for Ui (mi|si), except that qi (x|si) has been replaced
by the average
R∞
−∞ q(x|y)qi(y|si) dx of the evaluator’s beliefs. Both q(x|y) and qi(y|si) are
normal densities, and their product can be rewritten as A0 exp{−A1 [y −A2 (x, si)]2 −
A3 [x−A4 (si)]2} where A0, A1, A3 are constants not depending on x, y, si, the constant
A2 depends on x, si only, and A4 (si) = [τ 0τ isi+ (ν + τ 0 + τ i) νµ]/[τ 0τ i+ (ν + τ 0 + τ i) ν].
We then find
R∞
−∞ q(x|y)qi(y|si) dy = A5 exp
©
−A3 [x−A4 (si)]2
ª
where A5 is independent
of x, si. The forecaster’s objective function (14) is of the same form as previously, whereR∞
−∞ q(x|y)qi(y|si) dx is a normal density with mean A4 (si) strictly between µ and si. As
in Proposition 1, forecaster i will deviate from any fully separating strategy mi by issuing
the conservative mi (A4 (si)) 6= mi (si) for any si 6= µ.
For the binary reputational equilibrium, suppose that all opponents apply the binary
strategy with threshold µ. Again, (14) gives Ui (mi|si) = E {Wi (mi|x)E [q(x|y,m−i)|si]},
where Wi (mi|x) is precisely the same as in the proof of Proposition 3. That proof carries
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over to this new situation, since E [q(x|y,m−i)|si] ≥ E [q(2µ− x|y,m−i)|si] when x ≥ µ
and si ≥ µ. The latter fact follows from the fact that when si ≥ µ, all opponents are more
likely to issue messages m−i favorable to x.
Second, we turn to the forecasting contest. Suppose that all opponents use the lin-
ear strategy mˆ (s) = Cs + (1 − C)µ where C ∈ (0, 1]. The hypothetical observation
of y = ci and of signal si gives two independent sources of information about x. Then
x|ci, si ∼ N ((νµ+ τ 0ci + τsi) / (ν + τ 0 + τ) , 1/ (ν + τ 0 + τ)). Conditionally on y = ci
and si, the message mˆ (sj) = Cx + Cεj + (1− C)µ is normally distributed with mean
C (νµ+ τ 0ci + τsi) / (ν + τ 0 + τ)+(1−C)µ and varianceC2 (ν + τ 0 + 2τ) / [(ν + τ 0 + τ) τ ].
The density of correct opponent guesses is
γ(ci|ci, si)=
q
(ν+τ0+τ)τ
(ν+τ0+2τ)C22π
exp
·
− [ν+(1−C)τ0+τ ]
2τ
2(ν+τ0+2τ)(ν+τ0+τ)C2
³
ci− [ν+(1−C)(τ0+τ)]µ+Cτsiν+(1−C)τ0+τ
´2¸
, (15)
which is centered between µ and si. Nevertheless, when C < 1 this center remains closer to
µ than the honest estimate h (si) since the weight on si is smaller: Cτ/ (ν+(1−C) τ 0+τ) <
τ/ (τ + ν). Provided there exists a best response, this response is therefore biased away
from µ, by the same logic as before.
Recall that y|si ∼ N ((νµ+ τsi) / (ν + τ) , (ν + τ 0 + τ) / ((ν + τ) τ 0)). The objective
function logUi(ci|si) = log qi (ci|si) − log γ(ci|ci, si) is quadratic in the choice variable ci.
The first order condition characterizing the unique maximizer is
[ν+(1−C)τ0+τ ]2τ
(ν+τ0+2τ)C2
³
ci − [ν+(1−C)(τ0+τ)]µ+Cτsiν+(1−C)τ0+τ
´
= τ 0 (ν + τ)
¡
ci − νµ+τsiν+τ
¢
. (16)
Gathering terms, (16) can be rewritten as ci = Ksi + (1−K)µ. The equilibrium fixed-
point condition requires that the weight on si be equal to C, i.e.,
τ0
τ
(ν+τ) (ν+τ 0+2τ)C
2−[ν+(1−C) τ 0+τ ]2=τ 0(ν+τ 0+2τ)C−(ν+(1−C) τ 0+τ) τ . (17)
The total coefficient on C2 on the left hand side (LHS) is positive. At C = 0, the right
hand side (RHS) exceeds the LHS. At C = 1 the opposite is true. The unique solution
C ∈ (0, 1) defines an equilibrium, if it satisfies the second order condition. The second
order condition requires that the LHS is positive, or equivalently the RHS is positive,
i.e., C > τ (ν + τ 0 + τ) / [τ 0 (ν + τ 0 + 3τ)]. This condition can be checked by inserting
τ (ν + τ 0 + τ) / [τ 0 (ν + τ 0 + 3τ)] forC in equation (17) and verifying that the RHS exceeds
the LHS. This criterion for equilibrium existence is then
(ν+τ)(ν+τ0+2τ)τ(ν+τ0+τ)
2
τ0(ν+τ0+3τ)
2 −
³
(ν+τ0+τ)(ν+τ0+2τ)
ν+τ0+3τ
´2
<
(ν+τ0+2τ)τ(ν+τ0+τ)
(ν+τ0+3τ)
− (ν+τ0+τ)(ν+τ0+2τ)τ
ν+τ0+3τ
. (18)
For small τ 0 this condition fails since (ν + τ)
3 (ν + 2τ) τ 2/ (ν + 3τ)2 > 0. For large τ 0,
this condition holds since the coefficient on τ 20 is −1 < 0. ¤
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Proof of Proposition 9. First, we consider honesty. Supposing that all n forecasters
use a linear rule f = Hs+ (1−H)µ with H ∈ (0, 1), inversion gives s = µ+ (f − µ) /H.
Note that y = V + εy = x+ εy − εx. Then P − αssi/n is equal to
αy (x+ εy − εx)+ αsn
X
k 6=i
(x+ εk)+αµµ =
αyn+αs(n−1)
n
x+
αyn(εy−εx)+αs
P
k 6=i εk
n
+αµµ. (19)
Given signal si and forecast fi, then P is normally distributed with mean
αs
n
·
µ+
1
H
(fi − µ)
¸
+
αyn+ αs (n− 1)
n
E (x|si) + αµµ. (20)
Honest forecasting implies that this mean equals fi, i.e.,
fi =
αyn+ αs (n− 1)
n− αs/H
E (x|si) + αs (1− 1/H) + αµn
n− αs/H
µ. (21)
The condition for a symmetric equilibrium requires
H =
αyn+ αs (n− 1)
n− αs/H
τ
τ + ν
, (22)
which is solved by the expression given in equation (6).
For the reputational cheap talk theory, the market now observes (y, f1, . . . , fn). The
analysis is identical to the one given in Proposition 8. The closed-form solutions for the
natural language in predicting P are modified in a style similar to the above modification
of the honest strategy.
In the forecasting contest, suppose that all forecasters use a linear strategy f =
Cs + (1− C)µ. With an infinite number of forecasters, their average signal is at the
mean, so that P = αyy + αsx + αµµ = (αy + αs) x + αy (εy − εx) + αµµ. Note here that
αs < 1 corresponds to the relative precision of x versus y and the prior on V . Now, we have
x = [P − αy (εy − εx)− αµµ] / (αy + αs). Given P , the forecasts are normally distributed
with mean C (P − αµµ) / (αy + αs)+ (1− C)µ and variance C2
£
α2y (1/τ y + 1/τx) + 1/τ
¤
.
This defines the density γ of opponents’ forecasts. Similarly, given signal si, P is nor-
mally distributed with mean (αy + αs)E (x|si) + αµµ and variance (αy + αs)2 / (τ + ν) +
α2y (1/τ y + 1/τx). This defines the posterior belief density q. To find the best response,
each forecaster maximizes U(fi|si) = q(fi|si)/γ(fi|fi). The remaining analysis of the game
is along the lines of Proposition 8. ¤
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